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Postrevolutionary land encroachments in Cairo: Rhizomatic urban space making and the 
line of flight from illegality  
Jamie Furniss Social Anthropology, University of Edinburgh (email: 
jamie.furniss@ed.ac.uk)  
 
Abstract: After the January 2011 revolution, new and unpermitted constructions on 
previously empty land went up across Cairo at striking speed. This paper explores a case 
of such land encroachments carried out by waste collectors in the neighbourhood of 
Manshiet Nasser in Cairo, Egypt. It begins with theoretical debates about the production 
of urban space, arguing that the de Certeauian paradigm, in which urban marginals poach 
or hijack others’ spaces evanescently, fails to account for the way such encroachments 
produce permanent new spaces rhizomatically alongside the pre-existing order. The paper 
then turns to a close examination of the events in Manshiet Nasser. Although in a broad 
view the actors are marginals living in the ‘informal’ city, the conditions enabling the 
encroachments were such that only the wealthiest and most powerful members of the 
‘community’ benefitted. In a context of generalized ‘illegality’, the squatters rely on 
practical norms and de facto recognitions to obtain some degree of tenure security. Since 
these efforts rely on and play off legal norms even as the squatters violate them, the paper 
argues that property rights in this context should be understood not in classificatory terms 
based on the legal/illegal binary, but rather through a trajectory of ‘becoming-legal’: a 
‘line of flight’ that approaches legality asymptotically.  
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Introduction  
The 25 January 2011 Egyptian revolution generated a void of policing and authority. 
Many of Cairo’s ordinary residents sought to take advantage of this void, by encroaching 
on and repurposing spaces throughout the city. For example, the proliferation of street 
vending—also observed in Tehran after the Iranian revolution (Bayat, 1997)—was 
striking, especially in the underground tunnels of the Cairo metro. In the past, these had 
been among the city’s most orderly and well-policed spaces. Another important 
phenomenon throughout the city in the aftermath of the revolution (Sims, 2013), one on 
which this paper focuses, involved unpermitted construction on previously empty land. 
These encroachments, or land grabs, often occurred in forceful and not wholly legal 
ways.  
A de Certeau-inspired approach to the production of urban space, emphasizing the way 
pre-existing spaces are repurposed through evanescent processes of ‘poaching’ and 
détournement (hijacking) (e.g., through clever usages of time; an example given by de 
Certeau is doing personal work on company time), provides an insightful basis for 
analysing street vending, which is mobile and fleeting. Having materialized in ‘the space 
of others’ like a flash mob, much of the vending evaporated after President Abdel Fattah 
el-Sisi took power in 2014. Street vending was a temporal (and temporary) phenomenon 
with a spatial silhouette, but the land encroachments, on the other hand, are persistent and 
the new constructions immobile. Here, the de Certeauian paradigm is of less value, since 
it accounts for neither the permanence of the new structures nor the manner in which they 
allowed everyday residents of the city to physically create spaces of their own.  
This paper begins by developing this argument through a discussion of debates over the 
production of (urban) space, before turning to a case in point in the neighbourhood of 
Manshiet Nasser. After some history and background about the neighbourhood, the paper 
explores some of the sociological and legal dimensions of the encroachments through two 
sets of questions. First, how was the land appropriated and who benefited? Second, how 
do the squatters secure their tenure, and what role does the law play in this process 
despite the fact that the actions were illegal? These questions allow for making two 
principal points.  
First, in a broad-brush sociology the land grabbers clearly are urban marginals, and when 
viewed against the backdrop of the city as a whole and the potential responses of state 
actors, their position remains precarious. But from the perspective of a poorer resident of 
Manshiet Nasser, the fruit of the revolutionary power void was harvested by the wealthy 
and powerful in an unequal manner that emphasized dynamics of power and inequality 
within the ‘community’ and made internal contestation difficult. So although 
opportunities for land encroachment undoubtedly were an important pay-off of the 
revolution for people living on Cairo’s fringes and in the ‘informal’ city, we should be 
cautious about both the sociological homogenization of the squatters and an overly 
optimistic pro-poor reading of squatting as democratization of ownership and increased 
enfranchisement of the most vulnerable.  
Second, although the new buildings are unlikely to ever be fully legal, they are generally 
at different stages in a trajectory of what might be called, drawing inspiration from the 
vocabulary of Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 1987), ‘becoming-legal’. As ownership 
moves along this ‘line of flight’ from illegality, a series of elements accumulate and 
converge toward a situation that is not only an irreversible fait accompli, but also a 
legitimate practice acknowledged by state actors. In the trajectory of becoming-legal, 
legality is a horizon, approached asymptotically: the owner’s goal is not to achieve 
legality, yet some respect for and deference to legal norms must be shown.  
Do subalterns produce space other than through evanescent repurposing?  
From the Kabyle home in Algeria (Bourdieu, 1969) to villages in Lebanon (Gilsenan, 
[1982] 1990) and the Nile waterfront in Cairo (Ghannam, 2002), anthropologists of the 
Middle East and North Africa have long emphasized that the built environment’s form, 
meanings and uses are shaped by politics, power, law, economic interest, culture and so 
forth (see also e.g., Hall, 1969; Pétonnet, 1972). However space is both structured and 
structuring: space is shaped socially, but the social is also shaped by the spaces in which 
it unfolds. Some approaches thus emphasize how assemblages of objects (the built 
environment or the material dimension of space) have agentive power to shape human 
conduct, while others focus more on the way the built environment is built, that is, 
constructed by social forces. If we were to characterize analytic approaches to space in 
terms of mood, we might contrast a pessimistic Foucauldian outlook with an optimistic 
de Certeauian one. The former tends to regard spaces as limiting agency, potentiality and 
spontaneity; full of power, spaces constrain, discipline and subjugate. The latter tends to 
emphasize that people are never rendered wholly docile or obedient but always retain a 
sphere of action (agency) through which they can influence the meanings, uses and 
effects of space, for instance by repurposing it.  
In the literature on Egypt, these differences—between the spatial constitution of the 
social as opposed to the social constitution of space, but also between the institution’s 
pitiless triumph and the subaltern’s exuberant revenge—come out clearly in the contrast 
between Timothy Mitchell’s Colonising Egypt and Farha Ghannam’s Remaking the 
Modern. In the former, spaces are imposed by the colonial order as part of a project of 
‘containing, enframing, and disciplining’ (Mitchell, 1991: 92). The latter’s approach, on 
the other hand, emphasizes how ‘as active users, men and women reshape the city 
through their daily practices . . . [and] various groups strategically use and manipulate 
space to evade attempts to discipline them and regulate their relationships and activities’ 
(Ghannam, 2002: 22).  
The differences between these two authors extend to questions of what space consists of, 
how it is made and to whom the prerogative of generating it belongs. Mitchell regards 
space as conjured through a process he calls, borrowing from Heidegger, ‘enframing’. 
Enframing, Mitchell instructs, ‘is a method of dividing up and containing, as in the 
construction of barracks or the rebuilding of villages, which operates by conjuring up a 
neutral surface or volume called “space”’ (1991: 44). However, this definition of ‘space’ 
as something ‘abstract and neutral, a series of inert frames or containers’ (1991: 45)—an 
essentially Euclidean definition, in terms of magnitudes and angles, and in which people 
play little or no part—would satisfy few anthropologists. To anyone who regards space as 
not just physical but also social, processes of using and manipulating are themselves a 
form of spatial production. This view provides a basis for arguing that ordinary people 
are not just contained or enframed by spaces but also make, or least remake them as 
Ghannam puts it in the title of her book. This process of (re)making space may take place 
in the home or outside it (sidewalks, parks, shopping malls, shop floors, etc.) and thus 
ultimately extends to ‘the city’ itself, at least in a certain conceptual sense of the term.  
Drawing implicitly or explicitly on the conceptual vocabulary of Michel de Certeau, the 
form of agency (sphere of action) through which such spatial production occurs is often 
thought to consist of (everyday) practices, or what de Certeau calls ‘tactics’. For de 
Certeau, these include concealed work, the use of language, manners of cooking, walking 
in the city and dwelling in one’s home, to cite some of the seemingly banal activities 
examined over the two volumes of The Practice of Everyday Life (de Certeau, 1984; 
1998). Such practices or tactics are deployed in spaces ‘instituted by others’ (de Certeau, 
1984: 18), namely by institutions such as large businesses (e.g., factories), the military, 
cities and scientific institutions. The everyday city dweller thus moves through a 
‘prefabricated space’, the ‘space of the other’, ‘play[ing] on and with a terrain imposed . . 
. and organized by the law of a foreign power’ (de Certeau, 1984: 37). While de Certeau 
emphasizes ‘the subtle, stubborn, resistant activity of groups which, since they lack their 
own space, have to get along in a network of already established forces and 
representations’, in his view ordinary people ultimately ‘can only use, manipulate, and 
divert these spaces’ (de Certeau, 1984: 18; emphasis added).  
By regarding ordinary people as devoted largely to contestation and evanescent 
repurposing of spaces imposed by others, and at best the social rather than physical 
production of space, this de Certeau-inspired approach provides only a limited basis for 
arguing that everyday actors (re)make the city in more permanent ways. Yet, rather than 
merely subverting, reinterpreting or repurposing spaces instituted by others, the urban 
poor—whose settlements may be quite permanent and ordered—also coproduce the city 
through the process of creating the physical features of the built environment. This 
argument, while consistent with Ghannam’s work, extends it significantly. In much of 
Cairo’s recent urban development (both pre- and postrevolution), the various actors 
making up ‘the state’ in fact end up fighting a rear guard action to resist, ‘blow by blow’ 
(de Certeau’s phrase), residents’ forceful new initiatives, reversing the polarity of certain 
classic accounts of subaltern agency (Scott, 1985).  
Manshiet Nasser  
Having conducted ethnographic fieldwork (on development projects) and lived in the 
area intermittently over a period of several years beginning in 2007, I was already quite 
familiar with part of a Cairo neighbourhood called Manshiet Nasser, where in early 2011, 
an endogamous group of waste collectors and recyclers named ‘Zabbaleen’ appropriated 
and built on a piece of empty land. Before describing the appropriation, this section 
provides some contextual elements concerning Manshiet Nasser’s history, residents and 
toponyms, as well as the neighbourhood’s physical morphology, the extent to which 
residents do not legally own the land they live on and the real estate market that exists 
despite that fact.  
History, residents and toponyms  
The literature on the ‘ashw’iyyat (‘informal’ quarters) both in Cairo and in the region 
(e.g., Bayat & Denis, 2000; Kipper & Fischer, 2009; Séjourné, 2011; Ababsa et al., 2012; 
Sims, 2012: Chap. 4) is abundant. Various aspects of the neighbourhood of Manshiet 
Nasser (e.g., Tekce et al., 1994; Florin, 1999; Sims, 2002: 85–6; Séjourné, 2006; du Roy, 
2014) and the Zabbaleen as a social and livelihood group (e.g., Assaad, 1987/8; Meyer, 
1987; Haynes & El-Hakim, 1979; Debout & Florin, 2011; Furniss, 2012) have also been 
studied in depth. Many of the background elements for contextualizing the 2011 
appropriations are therefore already documented in detail elsewhere and will only be 
presented here in schematic terms.  
Manshiet Nasser came into existence in the 1960s and early 1970s when two separate 
groups of people started squatting on a piece of arid land beyond Cairo’s eastern 
cemeteries, to the far side of an often symbolic barrier: a set of railroad tracks. One 
group, traders in used building materials and construction labourers, settled next to the 
tracks, while the other group, the Zabbaleen, settled up high, near the cliffs, in the belly 
of an old quarry. It was the Zabbaleen who were responsible for the 2011 land 
encroachments.  
Prior to arriving in the quarry area at the foot of Moqattam Mountain, the Zabbaleen 
resided in the Giza Governorate, on the west bank of the Nile, in a neighbourhood called 
Imbaba. They were expelled from that site by governmental decree and were divided into 
three groups, each of which was settled at a different new location in the Cairo 
Governorate (on the east bank of the Nile). Some details of these events, which are well 
documented in the oral history, are provided in a memo signed by the Undersecretary for 
Housing and Services, which a local lawyer produced from his personal archive in the 
course of my fieldwork. The memo describes the three sites as having been chosen after 
field visits by a Ministry team assigned the task of relocating the zarayib, as the 
Zabbaleen neighbourhoods are referred to (more on this below). Manshiet Nasser, the 
second site mentioned in the memo, is described simply as ‘behind the Mahaggar 
[quarries] railroad’. Among the noteworthy aspects of the memo are its repeated 
emphases on the importance of locating the Zabbaleen at sites ‘distant from urban areas’ 
and beyond the limits of ‘future [urban] expansion’ (a gross underestimation of Cairo’s 
expansion over the next decades), along with spatial descriptors that rely on boundary-
type landmarks in specifying the new locations, for instance railroad tracks (‘behind’ and 
‘to the east of’). It is not an insignificant irony, given the almost definitional assumption 
that squatters act, at least initially, outside (or against) the framework of positive state 
law, that the government of Egypt itself settled the Zabbaleen at these sites. That is, 
incidentally, also true of the original non-Zabbaleen inhabitants of Manshiet Nasser, who 
were forcibly displaced from Ezbet al-Safih in the district of Gamaliyya—what 
foreigners often call ‘Islamic Cairo’ (Tekce et al., 1994).  
The Zabbaleen section of the neighbourhood has a special naming convention: it is 
referred to by residents and nonresidents alike as the zarayib. Foreigners often refer to it 
as Moqattam or ‘Garbage City’, but neither of those names has any local currency. 
Garbage City is a pure invention of a miserabilist media and non-governmental 
organization (NGO) discourse. Meanwhile, Egyptians normally use the name Moqattam 
to refer to the up-market neighbourhood on top of the mountain, above Manshiet Nasser 
and the zarayib. The word zarayib establishes a double metonymy, on the one hand 
between the neighbourhood where the Zabbaleen live and a space reserved for unclean 
animals, and on the other between the Zabbaleen as people and the animals they raise 
(pigs). The plural of zarība, zarayib is a word for an animal enclosure but connotes a 
muddy place. Since zarayib are not large spaces for noble herd animals like horses or 
camels, its best English translation—given that pigs were historically raised on organic 
waste in the neighbourhood then sold to slaughter—is not ‘corral’ but ‘pig sties’. 
Describing oneself or others as being from ‘the pig sties’ clearly has an especially 
negative symbolism and connotation in an Arabic-speaking and predominantly Muslim 
context, where the pig is religiously taboo. The zarayib epitomize what are supposed to 
be the defining features of the ‘ashw’iyyat in a commonly held social imaginary, which 
construes them not just as spaces but moral categories, associated with migrants from 
‘rural’ (especially Upper) Egypt, who bring with them unhygienic habits, disease, 
backwardness, moral turpitude and dirty animals (relatedly, see Ghannam, 2002: 64–65).  
Physical morphology, forms of illegality and the ‘informal’ real estate market  The 
physical morphology (rectilinear versus more medina-like) of the ‘ashw’iyyat, like their 
forms of illegality, depends on whether they are built on desert or agricultural land. In 
Cairo, 80 per cent of ‘ashw’iyyat are on agricultural land (Sims, 2002: 80), which is 
normally legally owned by a farmer who also legally sells it to another person (see 
Séjourné, 2012: 107). The legal problem arises neither from the absence of valid 
underlying title nor from the sale contract being void, but from the subsequent act of 
construction, since it is prohibited to build on cultivable land. In Latin America this form 
of urban development, in which the land is not squatted but the constructions are 
prohibited, is sometimes called ‘pirate urbanization’ (Gonzalez, 2009: 241). Since 
‘ashw’iyyat of this kind are laid out along pre-existing irrigation networks, their street 
networks tend to be extremely orderly and rectilinear.  
Manshiet Nasser belongs to the second broad category of ‘ashw’iyyat built on desert 
land. In Egypt, desert lands are state property (similar to what Commonwealth countries 
call ‘Crown Lands’). Whereas the formerly agricultural ‘ashw’iyyat might be thought of 
as suffering from ‘weak’ or ‘partial’ illegality insofar as they are built on titled land (even 
though the construction itself is unauthorized), the formerly desert ‘ashw’iyyat suffer 
from ‘strong’ or ‘complete’ illegality insofar as the squatters lack both the valid 
underlying title and permission to construct. These ‘ashw’iyyat often take on a more 
medina-like aspect, as they follow the contours of the land and other logics that generate 
winding streets.  
Despite suffering from ‘strong’ or ‘complete’ illegality, the Zabbaleen portion of 
Manshiet Nasser (along with the rest of the neighbourhood, although I have not 
personally conducted fieldwork there) has a thriving real estate market, with a quite 
accurate though essentially unrecorded cadastre and valuations. Land prices were 
upwards of EGP 3000 or approximately USD 600/m2 just prior to the revolution. Land 
titles are recognized on a customary basis by residents within the neighbourhood, though 
disputes over things like inheritance are common and at times acrimonious, even violent. 
The owner whose lands were appropriated after the revolution was not enmeshed in 
Zabbaleen kin networks and therefore could not rely on customary deference toward his 
ownership or draw on the collective strength of a patrilineage to defend himself when 
threatened. He was reliant for protection on a form of power that evaporated in early 
2011: that of the state.  
Postrevolutionary encroachments  
Despite the increasing density and pressure to build, a bare tract of land (Figure 1) at the 
southernmost entrance to Manshiet Nasser off the Moqattam road stood as the exception 
to the general rule that ‘land in Cairo is rarely empty’ (Elyachar, 2005: 68). However, 
after January 2011 (the start of the revolution) the scene reverted to the norm, as the 
neighbourhood’s Zabbaleen residents rapidly invaded and built on the land (Figures 1, 2). 
This section begins by describing the appropriated lands formerly owned by a man called 
Al-Narsh. It then describes how they were protected from encroachment prior to 2011 
and how the change of circumstances in early 2011 made it impossible for Al-Narsh to 
continue to assert his ownership of the land. It concludes by examining how the legal, 
financial and social conditions of their appropriation were such that only wealthy 
individuals were able to take advantage of this opportunity.  
Description of the appropriated land  
The area that was built up consists of two parcels divided by a road (Figure 2). The first 
of these, to the west of the main road leading into the neighbourhood, was leased by the 
state to a private individual for the purposes of stone quarrying, an activity that had been 
going on in the area for centuries. The quarrying had produced a 20-metre-deep hole, 
which was backfilled in a matter of weeks once the appropriations began. The second 
parcel of land, to the east of the main road, was used by the Al-Narsh tourism company to 
park buses. The owner of the company, Al-Narsh, had also built a restaurant called ‘the 
jungle’ in one corner of the land just beneath the Moqattam cliffs. Hence the parcel is 
referred to in the neighbourhood as Ard al-Jinjel or ‘the jungle land’ (Arabic speakers 
from Cairo generally pronounce the English letter ‘g’ as ‘j’).  
 
 
Figure 1. Unbuilt area. Source: Google Earth, historical views, November 2010.  
     
Figure 2. Above: unbuilt area November 2010. Below: same area after construction, 
April 2014. Source: Google Earth, historical views.  
 
The owner of the Al-Narsh tourism company, which had used the lands in these ways 
since approximately 1969, obtained a court ruling in 1990 conferring ownership of both 
pieces of land on the basis of the doctrine of wadʿ yadd—literally ‘the laying of hands’. 
This is a form of squatter’s rights or what in common law systems is often referred to as 
adverse possession and in civil law systems as acquisitive prescription. The construction 
of the restaurant was in all likelihood a deliberate strategy to strengthen the adverse 
possession case, since in the years I knew it, the restaurant was a failure as a commercial 
enterprise. Had its aim been to attract patrons, it would logically have been located closer 
to the main Moqattam road. Al-Narsh’s ownership right was registered with the land 
titles office in March 1993, after the initial court decision was confirmed on appeal. 
However the Governorate of Cairo continued to lease out the quarry to a third party long 
after losing the case, illustrating the limits of formal law and court processes in 
determining the legitimacy and security of land occupation, including vis-à-vis state 
actors, a point that is further elaborated in the next section.  
Means by which the land was appropriated  
Al-Narsh employed three or four guards to protect his land and parked vehicles. The most 
senior among them is a Zabbaleen resident of Manshiet Nasser. When I asked him to 
explain what happened to the land after the revolution, he began by introducing his 
former boss as ‘the whale of Moqattam’: the biggest man in town.  
He has 42 commercial operations, from the Moqattam to the Red Sea. His wife was 
a minister, his brothers were officers of the highest rank in the military, and his 
daughters live in Sharm al-Sheikh. One of them once hit a police officer at the 
airport with her shoe . . . (pers. comm., Cairo, 24 June 2016).  
In other words, they were untouchable. The fact that his daughter could hit a police 
officer with impunity was a particularly telling detail in this description.  
The guard explained in the same interview that prior to the revolution, whenever the 
Zabbaleen appropriated portions of Al-Narsh’s land, the guards would contact the local 
state authorities to inform them of the encroachment, and the buildings would be 
removed.  
Someone would build something, I would go tell the Hayy [the local authority in 
Manshiet Nasser], and they would knock it down. People would build again, and 
the same thing would happen. I told the guy [Al-Narsh], you have 33 feddans 
[Egyptian unit for measurement of land areas, approximately equivalent to an acre]. 
Why don’t you give 3 of them over to the squatters, and you can win the other 30. I 
took people [Zabbaleen residents] with me to talk with him, and they offered EGP 
500/m2, then [doubled it to] EGP 1000, but he refused (pers. comm., Cairo, 24 June 
2016).  
Thus, through recourse to state power, Al-Narsh was able to retain control of the land for 
approximately 40 years, both prior to and after the court decision, and without ceding 
even the 10 per cent his guard suggested as appeasement.  
‘But then what happened?’ the guard asked rhetorically. ‘When we experienced infilat 
amni [lax security] after the protests of 25 January, people started to squat on the land.’ 
This time around, things were different. A small group of individuals belonging to one of 
the most powerful clans in the area (more on this in a moment) led an initiative to ‘help 
the owner to understand’, as one person put it euphemistically, ‘that the land was for the 
people in the zarayib (pers. obs., Cairo, March 2013).’ The guard explained, insisting on 
the irony of Al-Narsh’s previous refusal of offers:  
When the people [demanding the land] became more numerous, and problems 
started, and people were going to kill him, he agreed to sell [the land] at EGP 400/ 
m2. When the problems increased, he sold it for EGP 400! That was during the 
revolution. The sale happened after the revolution (pers. comm., Cairo, 24 June 
2016).  
According to various accounts, Al-Narsh was told that if he did not sell the land to the 
Zabbaleen, they would simply take it and he would get nothing. According to the guard’s 
son (pers. obs., Cairo, March 2013), the Zabbaleen told Al-Narsh that ‘if he tried to give 
it [the land] to anyone else but them, they would kill him.’  
The land sold for EGP 400/m2 was in the quarry area and was approximately 55 000 m2. 
The Jinjel land, approximately 60 000 m2, was sold subsequently for prices between EGP 
1000/m2 and EGP 1200/m2. Al-Narsh was able to retain only a sliver of land on which he 
had established a garage and began building a mall (also taking advantage of the lax 
security) as well as another piece of land bordering the road leading up to Moqattam, 
which remains empty until today.  
Many people telling this story noted that the people who threatened Al-Narsh belonged to 
clans reputed for wealth and recourse to physical force, occasionally including firearms. 
The land sale price clearly signals that the sale was made under duress. Parcels bought for 
EGP 400/m2 in the immediate aftermath of the revolution were reselling for EGP 2500–
3500/m2 in March 2013. One man paid EGP 5000/m2 in 2013 for a prime plot of 200 m2 
with a view of the citadel. The overall cost to him, just for the bare land, was 
approximately USD 171 000 at an exchange rate of 5.85 (USD/EGP in February 2011). 
By the summer of 2016, it was claimed that the few remaining empty parcels were selling 
for EGP 7000–8000/m2. These prices reveal that land costs in one of Cairo’s most well-
known informal neighbourhoods are comparable to the top end of the formal market in 
some of Cairo’s most upscale neighbourhoods.  
Although the price paid to Al-Narsh was extremely low relative to the market price, it 
was still a very large sum. At EGP 400/m2, the 55 000-m2 quarry area would have fetched 
EGP 22 million or USD 3.76 million, and at EGP 1000/m2, the 60 000-m2 Ard al-Jinjel 
area would have cost a minimum of EGP 60 million or USD 10.256 million. This was 
essentially pure profit for Al-Narsh. Although the successful party to a wadʿ yadd case 
must pay the government for the land, the doctrine of mithl as-siʿr (equal price) dictates 
that this price is the appraisal value at the time Al-Narsh occupied the land in 1969, 
which in this case was determined to be EGP 0.25/m2.  
Who benefitted from the land appropriations  Two things are therefore clear about these 
land encroachments: they relied on a credible threat of physical force in order to 
intimidate the owner, and they required rapid mobilization of at least USD 15 million in 
capital, in a context where access to formal credit is somewhere between unlikely and 
impossible. To pull this off, conglomerates that combined the two necessary elements 
were formed from within the Zabbaleen kin network: men with significant financial 
resources and men who were powerful by virtue of social status, including factors such as 
the number of their male relatives and their reputations for recourse to brute physical 
force. These categories may obviously overlap but are not necessarily coterminous.  
Most Zabbaleen, among whom an endogamous marriage pattern is predominant, identify 
with one of approximately 15 extended patrilineal descent groups of varying sizes and 
reputations. At least one man from most of the powerful clans was included in a 
conglomerate. The members of various clans explained to me in the course of 
conversations I had in the neighbourhood that had one of their men not been included, 
they would have ‘caused problems’ for the other clans. So the play of physical force was 
not only between the Zabbaleen and the land owner, but also among the Zabbaleen 
themselves. However the inclusion of men from various clans in a conglomerate did not 
guarantee democratic access to the newly appropriated land or even its distribution to 
other members of the clans, only that the men included in the conglomerate personally 
acquired parcels. The men forming the initial conglomerates each chose to make use of 
the land in different ways, some building on a portion and selling a portion, some selling 
it all, and others holding onto it. Land was sold on varying terms: sometimes for cash and 
other times on qist (credit) generally on terms that required paying 20 per cent of the 
outstanding principal as interest each year until the principal was repaid in full. As a 
result of these sales the land is now ‘owned’ (socially, at least) by a broader patchwork of 
individuals. However this diversification was not a democratization. On the contrary, 
since as time passed, the price increased in the manner described above, and access was 
increasingly limited to a wealthy elite.  
Another factor influencing the demographics of the acquirers was the risk of fines and 
demolitions. As David Sims (2002) has argued, controls or restrictions on illegal 
construction in Cairo have not prevented it from occurring. Rather, the necessity of 
circumventing legal norms creates additional cost burdens for those who want to build, 
thus skewing access to property toward wealthier individuals. Hence governmental 
regulation of the sector has tended to exclude the poorest actors, by making auto-
construction less affordable than in the past or in other countries such as in Latin America 
(Sims, 2002: 95).  
In Manshiet Nasser, fines are part of the cost of doing business and can therefore be more 
accurately regarded as a tax on new constructions rather than punishment for acting 
outside the law. The large number of such cases have made them one of the core areas of 
practice for some lawyers in the neighbourhood. One such lawyer explained that as things 
stood in 2016, the law imposed a minimum fine of EGP 2000 per punishable act (a flat 
rate) and a maximum determined on the basis of a modular rate of EGP 600/m2 
multiplied by the surface area of the construction, multiplied by the number of punishable 
acts (pers. comm., Cairo, 20 June 2016). A ground floor is generally reputed to consist of 
four punishable acts. Subsequent floors generally consist of two acts. Thus, the owner of 
a four-storey house covering a surface area of 100 m2 could be fined a maximum of EGP 
840 000 (EGP 600/m2 × 100 m2 × 4 acts, or EGP 240 000, for the ground floor + EGP 
600/m2 × 100 m2 × 2 acts, or EGP 120 000, each for the subsequent floors) and a 
minimum of EGP 20 000 (EGP 2000 × 4 acts for the ground floor + EGP 2000 × 2 acts 
for each subsequent floor).  
The amount of the fine is not initially known to the house owners, who simply receive a 
notice that they have been fined. After receiving such a notice, they would typically 
retain a lawyer to ascertain the amount and, through a combination of court proceedings 
and bribes, reduce the amount (generally the maximum) to the minimum fixed rate of 
EGP 2000 per act. Thus, although fines over EGP 100 000 are commonly sought, the 
highest amount that I am aware of anyone actually paying is EGP 30 000 (approximately 
USD 5000). However the cost to the accused is higher than the fine, since legal fees and 
bribes must be factored in. For instance one set of clients negotiated a fee of EGP 8000 
with a lawyer for a case consisting of two illegal acts. The anticipated fine in this case, 
after the lawyer’s intervention, was EGP 4000. The remaining EGP 4000 covered the 
legal fee and the necessary bribes. Although the existence of informality/illegality within 
the bureaucracy (Olivier de Sardan, 2013: 51; also Koster & Nuijten, 2016, the 
introduction to this special section) is hardly a secret in Egypt, the lawyer refused to 
reveal the amount and the identity of the recipients of bribes, despite my probing of the 
issue.  
The risk of eviction or destruction also excluded all but the wealthiest Zabbaleen. This 
was underscored, for example, in a conversation with two brothers in their late 20s and 
early 30s (pers. comm., Cairo, March 2013). They were disturbed by their neighbours, 
and their home had architectural flaws that caused them to fear its collapse. I asked why 
they did not purchase some of the newly-appropriated land in order to try to get away 
from these problems. Unlike most Zabbaleen, they had inherited sufficient wealth for 
such a purchase. However the younger brother explained that they would only have built 
in the new area if they could suffer the investment’s loss without being completely wiped 
out, in the sudden event of governmental action to raze the homes and reclaim the land. 
They could not risk investing their entire savings in an uncertain project.  
Along similar lines, the quarry owner’s guard was given a 200-m2 plot in compensation 
for his years of loyal service, and purchased another plot of the same size for EGP 
400/m2. He subsequently sold both plots for EGP 1500/m2. His son often reproached him 
for doing so, lamenting that with hindsight if they had waited a little longer until the price 
rose, they could have been rich. The son was present when I interviewed the father and 
this subject of discord resurfaced between them despite the son having sat quiet for most 
of the interview. The father defended himself as follows: ‘But no one knew what would 
happen. By God, if the government was determined about it—I’m speaking truthfully—if 
the president wanted these lands back, do you think he would succeed in taking them, or 
not (pers. comm., Cairo, March 2013)?’ The father felt he should sell the land quickly, 
because of the uncertainty over whether his land grab would withstand the test of time. 
This attitude reflects the fact that the family lacked the financial or social power of the 
other acquirers. Thus, those with sufficient wealth and social status to act boldly in this 
market made more money than those who felt their positions were weak and needed to 
minimize risk.  
Tekce, Oldham and Shorter claim that in Manshiet Nasser in the 1980s, persons 
attempting to appropriate a second plot of land when already in possession of a place to 
live were routinely ‘forced by social pressure to give up the second claim to persons who 
had no plot based on a sense of equity’ (Tekce et al., 1994: 24). If such romantic 
enforcement of social justice ever did exist in the neighbourhood, it had certainly ceased 
by the time of the postrevolutionary land encroachments. In the vast majority of cases (if 
not all), the appropriated parcels were second plots of existing landowners. Some 
interviewees indicated that they had the opportunity to participate in appropriations but 
refused to do so on moral grounds. Although they condemned those who had participated 
as greedy, this moral discourse seems to have no effect on landownership. As one might 
expect, a process as unequal and potentially lucrative as this was not without conflict, but 
to my knowledge violence erupted not between the acquirers and the landless or those 
who did not succeed in obtaining a second plot, but rather within the group that acquired 
the land. For example a dispute over how to share a 3000-m2 prime piece of land at the 
entrance of the neighbourhood led to one partner wounding another by gunshot.  
The becoming-legal of the new constructions  
The people who appropriated these lands rely on a variety of elements to avoid eviction 
and achieve a degree of legitimacy. These include speedy construction, so that their 
possession is solidly anchored before the government has time to react; water and 
electricity connections, which imply de facto state recognitions; exchanges of money 
that, while not conferring title, indicate a degree of acquiescence on the part of the former 
owner and state officials; and the aesthetics of the buildings, which seek to alter and 
contest perceptions that could lead to the law being enforced. These factors can be 
thought of as points along a line of flight (Deleuze & Guattari, [1980] 1987) from 
illegality. Since the trajectory of this line of flight is shaped by law and legal procedures 
even as they are violated, I suggest that cases such as the above cannot be understood 
through categorical terms that rely on a sharp distinction between legal and illegal, and 
should instead be conceptualized as a process of becoming-legal. This section begins by 
elaborating on the gap between legal and practical norms, between what the law says and 
what government officials actually do (including the existence of informality and 
illegality within the bureaucracy, already mentioned above), and contradictions that exist 
even within the formal legal system. This section then turns to the different aspects of the 
line of flight enumerated above.  
Postrevolution land encroachment in Cairo 321  
The insufficiency of the ‘categorical’ approach to illegality  In a discussion with one 
informant from Manshiet Nasser (pers. comm., Cairo, May 2014), he explained that what 
allowed the Zabbaleen to act after the revolution was the sudden absence of ḥukūma 
(government). When I restated his view in terms of the absence of qanūn (law), without 
thinking much about the difference between the two terms, he made a point of correcting 
my vocabulary: what created the opportunity after the revolution was not the absence of 
law, but of government, he insisted. Whether the law was as present as ever, or as absent 
as ever, I took the speaker to mean that what the people wearing uniforms actually do 
matters more than what the rule book says. Indeed state officials themselves are deeply 
involved in the emergence, proliferation and perenniality of extralegal urban 
development and tenure practices in Egypt. For example when Eric Denis (2012) studied 
Hernando de Soto’s land tenure formalization project in Egypt, he discovered that the 
reasons for the project’s spectacular failure went beyond bureaucratic lethargy or 
inefficiency. Low-ranking civil servants and government officials themselves worked 
against its implementation, because they were invested in and benefited from (financially 
and otherwise) the lack of clarity around land titles.  
One way of theorizing this divide between, on the one hand, the codified and presumptive 
functioning of a system and, on the other, accepted or habitual practices and customs, is 
in terms of a gap between the formal law that purportedly governs ownership and the 
practical norms (Olivier de Sardan & Herdt, 2015) that in fact determine the outcome of 
most cases. This approach seeks to adopt a sympathetic view, according to which 
circumspection for formal legal process and court proceedings reflects a practical savvy 
informed by circumstance, rather than wanton or ‘criminal’ disregard for the law. This is 
not the same as saying the law is irrelevant, since in the case of land rights in Egypt the 
relevant practical norms differ from but are not entirely independent of positive law. 
‘Category’ or ‘classificatory’ thinking (Laplantine, 2015) in which actions or forms of 
possession are labelled legal or illegal, or even fixed somewhere along a spectrum 
between the two (escaping the oversimplified binarism), makes little sense in a context 
where the label ‘illegal’ gives no indication of how widespread, accepted or perennial the 
phenomenon is. Most of Cairo’s new urban constructions are illegal in one respect or 
another, yet there they stand. Meanwhile, legal right is no guarantee of untroubled 
possession, as Al-Narsh’s fate clearly demonstrates. Al-Narsh’s ownership right was 
contested and overridden not only by other private actors at a time when he could not rely 
on government protection; the Governorate of Cairo did the same prior to the revolution, 
by continuing to lease a portion of the land to a third party, even after a court had ruled 
that the land no longer belonged to the state. Thus, as the editors of the present special 
section point out (Koster & Nuijten, 2016), contradictions within formal regulations and 
official legal processes may make it incorrect, in contexts such as this one, to assume that 
a formally recognized legal right offers security, or that following the procedures 
prescribed by official legal process will eliminate risk or dispute. There are, however, a 
number of factors that solidify ownership claims, as will now be discussed.  
Possession is nine-tenths of the law  
The formal penalties for illegal construction range from fines to demolition and even 
imprisonment of both the owner and builder (Denis, 2012: 230, contra Elyachar, 2005: 
72). But in practice the more draconian penalties are rarely if ever applied: ‘cases of 
demolition of districts constructed on privately owned land or on state-owned land are 
quite rare’ in Cairo (Séjourné, 2012: 104–5; see also Denis, 2012: 235; Sims, 2002). 
Since  ‘reversing’ informal urbanization through eviction or destruction is uncommon, 
the Zabbaleen (and other ‘ashw’iyyat residents alike) deploy a fait accompli strategy: 
when the decision is made to build, work often begins on a holiday or at night and goes 
on 24 hours a day in an attempt to firmly establish building structures before government 
officials have time to react. Several floors can be erected over a weekend, and the 
buildings sprout up at incredible speed, like time-lapse sequences of a plant’s growth 
over a whole season.  
Some demolitions occurred in Manshiet Nasser shortly after the revolution; others 
continue to occur sporadically, up to the time of writing. However these mainly affected 
enclosure walls that owners erect on boundaries of parcels in order to signify their 
appropriation. Recognizably different from efforts to construct a home, these walls 
typically consist of large white or grey cinder blocks rather than the smaller red bricks 
used for homes and often consist of only a few courses of bricks with no reinforced 
concrete. In the course of my fieldwork, I did not find any demolitions of buildings that 
were genuinely intended by their owners to become living or working spaces.  
Documents, utility connections and other de facto recognitions  
One question that could be asked about these land encroachments is, considering that in 
the end the constructions are still illegal and their ownership is never formally recognized 
in law, why do people exchange money with the original owner and willingly pay the 
fines? The simple answer with respect to the fines is that in case of nonpayment there is a 
risk of imprisonment. However the extent to which some residents welcomed the chance 
to pay the fines appears to go beyond avoiding risk to personal liberty. The sale is more 
paradoxical. Why pay USD 15 million for contracts that cannot be registered with the 
land titles office and in a context where the threat of force would seemingly allow for 
seizing the land outright?  
Although the writing at the top of the documents obtained in exchange for the money 
given to the land’s previous owner identifies them as ‘aqd, or contracts, most people refer 
to them as mustanad, meaning simply a ‘document’. The root word of mustanad, sanad, 
according to Hinds and Badawi’s Dictionary of Egyptian Arabic, refers to an ‘item of 
evidence, the basis of a legal argument’. When the mustanad respects the terms of ʿurfi 
(customary) contracts—for example when it is signed by the parties and two male 
witnesses—it can later be homologated through the court procedure of daʿwā ṣaḥa tawqī ʿ 
(authentic signature claim). Resort to this procedure is common, even though it is not the 
required form for real estate conveyancing and therefore does not confer a basis for the 
registration of ownership rights with the land titles office (see Sims, 2002: 87). The 
mustanad thus has a status like that of a holographic will: while not legally binding, it has 
evidentiary value. It is ‘written up and signed in order to “increase the legitimacy, if not 
the legality”’, as the introduction of the present special section puts it (Koster & Nuijten, 
2016, quoting Varley, 2002: 452). The desire for the mustanad is part of a logic aimed at 
generating evidence, even though it does not meet legal requirements. The same thinking 
is at work when people undertake procedures aimed at obtaining tamlīk (legal 
ownership), knowing full well that they will never get to the end of the process in their 
lifetimes (Sims, 2002: 83–84). Partially completing the process can strengthen one’s 
claim even if full legal ownership is never recognized or obtained.  
One of the main practical uses of the mustanad is in obtaining water and electricity 
supply to the new buildings. The utilities provide for practical needs but also confer a 
certain recognition and legitimacy: the utilities are publicly owned, and the utilities 
authorities install official meters in the premises they supply. By 2014 many buildings in 
the newly occupied area had water and electricity supplies, which were obtained through 
‘self-help’ connections, not official provision. People with illegal hook-ups still 
endeavour to obtain a meter and a legal connection, suggesting that their aims go beyond 
meeting their material necessities, particularly since after metering they will have to pay 
for a service they previously stole.  
In 2016 there was a scare in the neighbourhood, as rumours spread that some residents 
would be evicted and that their commercial recycling activities would be banned from the 
area. The rumours generated a Facebook discussion (pers. comm., 8 June 2016) among a 
practicing lawyer, a law graduate (who is now the owner of a plastics recycling 
workshop) and some of their friends, in which they clarified how they saw the issue of 
ownership in practice and how such elements secured the residents’ claims even if they 
were illegal:  
Law graduate: Manshiet Nasser is government land and all of it is squatted, it’s not 
legal. So forget about legally registering your property in your name. The contracts 
we write up are kidda wi kidda [just something] between us.  [. . .]  
Lawyer: Don’t tell me that these contracts are just something between us because 
they prove the existence rights and obligations between individuals [note that he 
insists on their evidentiary value even though they are not a basis for land titles 
registration]. On their basis, people changed homes. That is the first point. Second, 
these contracts were also used to get utility connections. The fact that we cannot 
register the contracts at the land titles office is not the problem of Manshiet Nasser 
alone, but the whole of Egypt.  
Law graduate: That is correct, ya mitr [a form of address for lawyers, derived from 
the French]. Is it OK for me to take your house when you have a 
contract?  Lawyer: Even if he has no contract, he has electricity in his name, and 
water, it is a publicly known fact that he lives there, the municipality has made 
additions/improvements [such as street lights, paved roads, etc.] and there has been 
stable, unperturbed ownership, without contestation, for a long period of time.  
[. . .]  A friend: This is why you pay ‘awayid [meaning either royalties or taxes 
assessed on property for local purposes, most likely a euphemism for bribes in this 
instance].  
Thus, the practical and social effects of the exchanges of money—the money paid to the 
original owner but fines and bribes as well—exceed their legal implications. The 
monetary exchanges indicate acquiescence, generate documentation and form the basis 
for other de facto recognitions such as utility hook-ups.  
The aesthetics of the new constructions  
The typical built form of the ‘ashw’iyyat—banal and undecorated concrete, rebar and red 
brick structures that look as though they are perpetually under construction—is not at all 
that of the ‘outside in’ architecture of the stereotypical riyadh-style home supposed to 
typify the ‘Islamic City’. A built form that eliminates open space between buildings and 
seeks to enclose it within inner courtyards invisible to passers-by is almost impossible to 
find in contemporary Cairo. However, somewhat in keeping with that idealized (to some 
extent, imagined) ‘classic’ form, apart from balconies, the old buildings in Manshiet 
Nasser almost all ‘present to the public streets and alleyways a uniform and (a chastely 
decorated door occasionally aside) extremely subdued face’ (Geertz, 1989: 299). 
Decorative architectural elements in the Zabbaleen portion of Manshiet Nasser are few to 
nonexistent (Figure 3), apart from religious markings such as crosses, and Islamic or 
Christian phrases appearing in relief in walls. 
However, the new constructions differ from the previously familiar look of buildings in 
the area, most notably in the former’s adoption of decorative facades and curved 
balconies extending out from the familiar rectangular building profile (Figures 4–6). To 
understand why this is the case, we need to consider that the new buildings are visible 
from the Moqattam road and are thus seen by non-Zabbaleen passers-by, in particular the 
residents of the wealthy Moqattam neighbourhood. These onlookers, as well as 
government officials considering how to deal with the new constructions, can be safely 
assumed to share in the commonly held social imaginary that sees the ‘ashw’iyyat in 
general and the zarayib in particular as a foil for the ‘modern’ and ‘developed’ city. The 
root word ‘ashwā’ī, meaning ‘random in nature’, is not insignificant here, particularly 
since in Egypt the semantic field of random, chaotic, disordered, mixed, etc., is more 
pejorative than in English. The vocabulary of ‘disorder’ has been central in framing and 
justifying the Egyptian bureaucracy’s project of modernizing and beautifying (read: 
disciplining or eliminating) not just the ‘ashw’iyyat, but other domains as disparate as 
religious festivals and road traffic (Schielke, 2008; Singerman, 2009). 
The decorative features are thus not just a question of pride, prestige or status for the 
owners, but also one of security against eviction. In the context of a discourse on the 
‘ashw’iyyat that includes an important aesthetic dimension, the new buildings seek to 
assert, through their attractiveness, their legitimate belonging to Cairo’s modern 
cityscape. They are an attempt to project a particular (and novel) image of the garbage 
collectors and their neighbourhood, to change the face of the zarayib and become worthy 
of respect in the eyes of the government, as one person explained in the previously 
mentioned discussion on Facebook (pers. comm., 8 June 2016):  
forget about the problem of ownership [the strictly legal question]. When the 
government ‘becomes generous to us,’ I suggest that we do the following. And I 
think that 80 per cent of the people of the neighbourhood could participate in this 
[financially]. We can do a beautification project for the building facades. We’ll get 
a company . . . to propose a few designs, and we’ll choose a unified colour scheme 
for the whole area. This way we will attract the attention of the people in 
government who are responsible for dealing with us, and we’ll become a positive 
example, worthy of respect. 
 
    
Figure 3. Above: Typical construction style in Manshiet Nasser. Photograph by author, 
January 2010. Below: view of the land encroachments from above, on the Moqattam 
road. Immediately after taking this photo I was stopped and questioned by plainclothes 
police officers. Photograph by author, March 2013.  
 
This idea inspired a local association to begin a fundraising drive to build a wall and do 
landscaping at the entrance of the neighbourhood, for which the association sought 
donations from prominent local people and posted the amount of their contribution on 
Facebook to encourage others to donate. 
     
Figure 4. Above: construction under way. White brick enclosure walls were at times 
destroyed, but during my fieldwork no red brick constructions were demolished. Below: 
Moqattam road frontage, with evidence of the increased attention paid to facades of 
buildings visible from the road. Photograph by author, March 2013.  
  
 
Figure 5. Curved balconies extending out from the building, architectural features not 
previously seen in Manshiet Nasser. The roof of the unfinished building in the 
background to the right is the vantage point from which Figure 4 was photographed. 
Photograph by author, October 2013.  
  
Figure 6. A decorative facade, previously unseen in Manshiet Nasser. Foreground: a 
Zabbaleen truck returning from waste collection rounds. Photograph by author, October 
2013. 
Conclusion  
People all across Cairo are making the spaces they inhabit, not just through social 
practices but by literally building them out of bricks and mortar. The kind of de Certeau-
inspired analysis offered by an author like Ghannam does not provide an adequate basis 
for theorizing a contribution to urban space of this kind. Following François Laplantine’s 
invitation to rethink the social through the mediation of the botanical (2015: 60–62), if 
we were to use Deleuze and Guattari’s dendrological vocabulary to analogize space to a 
plant, then I argue that de Certeau and Ghannam’s critique does not ‘shatter the linear 
order’ (Deleuze & Guattari, [1980] 1987: 92) of space conceived of like ‘the tree or root, 
which plots a point, fixes an order’ (Deleuze & Guattari, [1980] 1987: 7), but seeks 
instead to show how subaltern practices emerge from the trunk like branches or offshoots. 
Such arborescent ramifications of a solidified, pre-existent linear order—‘micro-
multiplicities’ to use another term from Deleuze and Guattari—certainly exist. However 
this paper has sought to expand our approach to the way marginals make urban space, in 
order to also account for a different kind of space making—rhizomatic urban space 
making—in which new spaces sprout alongside pre-existing spatial forms the way shoots 
appear at intervals along the horizontal rootstalks botanists call rhizomes.  
I have made two main points about Manshiet Nasser, an example of a particular 
neighbourhood at quite a particular postrevolutionary moment but which speaks to much 
broader themes. The first is that the conditions under which the land appropriations 
occurred allowed only the wealthiest members of the local community to benefit. Second, 
drawing on Deleuze and Guattari’s antistructural emphasis on ‘becomings’, I argue that 
the new constructions are involved in a process of becoming-legal. This notion attempts 
to reconcile the fact that property rights and tenure security cannot be understood through 
positive law alone, yet law gives shape to their trajectory along a line of flight that is 
‘forever in the process of being drawn, toward a new acceptance, the opposite of 
renunciation or resignation’ (Deleuze & Guattari, [1980] 1987: 207).  
This ambiguous, simultaneously progressive and regressive case challenges the implicit 
or explicit David and Goliath politics through which phenomena of this kind are often 
approached in scholarly writing. While the ‘dour atmosphere of institutional 
triumphalism’ (Buchanan & Lambert, 2005: 3) of Foucauldian analyses contrasts with the 
creative and rebellious individuality that animates the de Certeauian approach, the two 
are in fact not divided in their underlying politics but rather in their optimism about 
whether the anarchic spirit that both implicitly endorse is crushed—or alive and well. 
And just as similar politics may lead to differing analyses, differing politics may lead to 
similar conclusions, as when left-leaning ‘heroic’ squatter stories (cf. Davis, 2006: 44) 
and right-leaning post-Washington consensus tales of the urban poor’s entrepreneurial 
capacity for unaided self-help (à la Hernando de Soto) both glorify urban squatters and 
their ‘agency’. Perhaps we should be satisfied that in 2011 the people from the ‘pig sties’ 
put one over on the ‘whale of Moqattam’, a man so powerful his daughter could get away 
with hitting a police officer with her shoe. But I struggle to find a cause for rejoicing 
when the biggest man in town made out with USD 15 million, and those who seized the 
land from him are a who’s who of stacked and interlocking local inequalities.  
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